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ABSTRACT 
The  international  transmission  of  shocks  in  population  growth  and  technology  is 
examined  in  an  interdependent  two-country  world  economy;  decisions concerning  the 
intertemporal allocation are  made  by  social  planners  with  an  infinite  horizon  and  an 
endogenous rate of  time preference. Steady state shocks in population growth are shown to 
be  negatively  transmitted to the rate of  time  preference. In the steady state, the optimal 
foreign debt is determinate and it brings about a convergence of  time preference.  The net 
creditor and debtor positions in the steady state depend on the discount rate functions, the 
states of  technology and  the  rates of  population growth. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Fluctuations in economic activity triggered off by  productivity shocks 
figure  prominently  in  research  on  closed  and  open  economics  (see 
Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Cantor and Mark,  1987 and Clarida, 1990). 
A much neglected determinant of economic fluctuations is the change in 
the demography of  a country. Van Imhoff (1989) has shown for a closed 
economy  that  a  permanent  demographic  shock  can  trigger  off  real 
(*) The  author  gratefully  acknowledges comments  by  Lans  Bovenberg,  Sukhamoy 
Chakravarty (who unfortunately passed away in August 1990), Gerbert Hebbink, Evert van 
Imhoff, an anonymous referee and conference participants at the annual meeting (1991) of 
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business cycles.  This  finding may  be  more  attractive to the  student of 
(real) business cycles than the results of King et ul. (1988), who find that 
recurrent technology shocks are needed to generate economic fluctuations 
in a standard neoclassical growth model. Only recently Becker and Barro 
(1988,  1989)  have  stressed  the  need  for  dynamic  general  equilibrium 
models with endogenous population growth. This paper will not go as far 
as to endogenise fertility choice or migration but instead it will look into 
the  question  of  how  (exogenous)  shocks  in  population  growth  and 
technology are transmitted  to consumption, time preference, capital and 
debt  accumulation. 
A deterministic, perfect foresight model is presented of two interdepen- 
dent  countries,  each  inhabited  by  a  social  planner  with  an  infinite 
planning horizon  and with  an endogenous rate  of  time preference. The 
interdependence of  the  two  countries  is  made  explicit  by  international 
goods and capital markets. A difference in the state of technology and/or 
population  growth  rates  is  assumed throughout  the  analysis. 
The question examined in this paper is the grand question of optimal 
ecomic growth: how much should a country consume today and save for 
the  future in  order  to enjoy  the  maximum  amount  of welfare  over its 
planning  horizon? The  well-known Golden  Rule  of  Capital Accumula- 
tion, as derived by  Koopmans (1965) and Cass (1965), offers us a guiding 
principle for closed econimics. In a competitive world economy characte- 
rised  by  perfect  capital mobility,  the central  question  of  the  theory  of 
optimal  economic growht  should  be  extended to  include another  que- 
stion,  viz,  where  should  a  country  invest  its  savings?  The  standard 
one-sector model has,  however, its drawbacks  in  analysing steady state 
optimal  allocations  in  a  world  economy  characterised  by  (constant) 
different population growth rates. The standard optimal growth model is 
therefore extended with an endogenous rate of time preference. There are 
three reasons for studying the issue of endogenous time preference. First 
of all, there is the neglected normative question of how social planners in 
an  interdependent  world  economy  should  treat  future  generations.  If 
planners  use  the  average  utility  criterion,  the  problem  of  optimal 
economic  growth  in  a  world  of  diverging  populations  shows  some 
similarities with  the case of  lending and borrowing between households 
or agents with differences in impatience. The most patient household will 
accumulate assets infinitely, while the less patient  households are all net 
debtors living eventually at a subsistence level. In a positive sense there 
seems some evidence from panel data (see Lawrance, 1991) that the rate 
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incomes, race and education. Similar differences among countries is quite 
likely  although  empirical evidence is  still lacking. The  introduction  of 
endogenous time  preference tries  to  establish  microecomic  foundations 
for such a state of affairs, but, as will be shown in the paper, at the same 
time the theory poses counterintuitive results. Secondly, the rate of time 
preference is generally treated  as a parameter,  despite its importance in 
determining economic activity. For instance, in international  and inter- 
temporal trade, explanatory factors such as technology, endowments and 
the rules of the game (market structure, trade restrictions) play a domi- 
nant  role.  However,  the  role  of  such  an  obvious  factor  as  taste  or 
preference is generally played down. It is my  hunch that one can increase 
understanding  of  macroeconomic phenomena,  such  as  the  current  ac- 
count  imbalances  of  the  U.S.  and  Japan,  by  paying  attention  to 
differences in  time preference. Thirdly, since the concept of endogenous 
time  preference  is  more  and  more  used  in  various  macroeconomic 
analyses, it may serve a purpose in pushing this model to its limits and 
see  what  it  essentially implies for  steady state distributions. 
The paper is organised as follows. First, as a quick refresher, I will set 
up  the  optimal  growth  model  with  endogenous  time  preference  in 
a  closed  economy  (section  2).  Section  3  shows  how  resources  are 
allocated intertemporally in a two-country world economy when the rate 
of  time  preference  is  endogenous  in  both  countries.  A  normative 
interpretation  is  offered  and  the  analysis  of  comparative  statics  is 
performed.  In  the  last  section (4)  I  will  sum up  the  findings. 
2. A CLOSED ECONOMY GROWTH MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS TIME PREFE- 
RENCE 
The  standard  problem  of  optimal  economic  growth  or  saving  is 
concerned with  the following problem: maximize welfare of  the indige- 
nous population over an infinite hoziron by  appropriate investment and 
consumption  choices. This problem  has  many  variants  and I will  only 
consider one particular  variation  to this theme, viz.  the endogeneity of 
time  preference.  Decisions  are  taken  by  a  social  planner,  who  has 
complete control over the level of consumption per capita, c(t),  and the 
aggregate capital/labour ratio,  k  (1).  The planner  uses  a  utility  functio- 
nal (I)  with an endogenous rate of time preference, p(t),  over an infinite 
(I)  A  similar model is  used  in  Lucas  and Stokey (1984)  and Buckholtz  and Hartwick 
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horizon. This  objective function  has  the  following form  (see  for  more 
details Uzawa,  1968): 
where  U  is  a  well-defined  concave  utility  function  (U’  > 0,  U“ < 0). 
A number of  conditions are needed to guarantee a stable solution. The 
following Uzawa-conditions should  be  satisfied for  the  time  preference 
function  p (.): 
p (U)  > 0,  p’ (U)  > 0,  p”(U)  > 0  for  all  U > 0  (2) 
and 
The relationship between  the instantaneous  rate of  time preference and 
current  utility  is  positive  and  the  first  and  second  derivatives of  time 
preference  with  respect  to  utility  are  also  positive.  A  higher  level  of 
consumption at time s increases the discount factor applied to utility at 
and after s (i.e.  the second assumption in condition (2)).  The condition 
p’  > 0 is not much favoured by  economists (e.g.,  Blanchard and Fischer 
(1989)  warn  readers  of  their  book  not  to  use  the  Uzawa-model  for 
problems in  general). Whether impatience to consume should increase or 
decrease as actual  consumption  rises is  subject to considerable debate. 
There  are  two  reasons  why  one  could  be  persuaded  to  use  this 
assumption. First, as Lucas and Stokey (1984) and Epstein (1987) point 
out  in  a  setting  with  many  consumers  one  needs  the  property  of 
increasing  marginal  impatience  to  produce  unique  and  locally  stable 
wealth distributions. One can see their point by  considering the alternati- 
ve  p’ < 0 for steady state distributions. This last inequality would imply 
that  as consumption rises  one would  rather  consume more at a  future 
dats than  today.  This  would  seem  to  be  a  model  with  Uncle  Scroo- 
ge-properties:  the  rich  would  get  richer  and  richer  as  consumption Optimal  international  debt  and  endogenous  time preference  273 
increases since the weights attached to future income streams increase. In 
a  steady  state  the  equilibrium  interest  rate  would  become  smaller  as 
consumption  increases and  hence  the  capital  stock  will  become larger, 
and  equally  so  consumption  etc.,  etc.  To cut  a  long  story  short,  the 
model explodes. Secondly, besides considerations of  stability there is an 
empirical argument.  Zin  (1987) presents empirical evidence (*) in  favour 
of  the  assumption  of  increasing marginal  impatience. 
Condition (3) ensures that between two stationary consumption paths 
the one with  the higher  level  of  instantaneous  utility is  preferred. With 
these  conditions  in  mind,  the  planner  maximizes  (1)  subject  to  the 
following differential equations: 
Equation  (4)  describes the  development of  the  rate  of  time  preference 
over  time,  and  differential  equation  (5)  describes  the  change  of  the 
physical capital/labour ratio over time, dkldt. The capital stock increases 
if  the national product, y(t),  exceeds the level of consumption per capita 
and the investment necessary to compensate for depreciation and capital 
dilution, (6 +  n)  k (t). The national product is described by  the standard 
production  function y (t) = Zf[k  (t)],  where  Z denotes  the  disembodied 
state  of  technology  and  f(  .)  represents  the  functional  relationship 
between  production  and  the  capital/labour  ratio.  The  function  f(.) 
satisfies the  standard  Inada-conditions. 
To simplify the analysis one can solve the optimization problem first 
by transforming the time variable t into one in terms of which the rate of 
time preference becomes a constant. Following Uzawa (1968, p. 491) and 
Obstfeld (1983),  if  we  take p  as the independent variable instead of  t we 
can  obtain  the  following maximand: 
(*) For  those  persuaded  by  experimental  evidence I  should  mention a  ‘reference’  in 
Engel  and  Kletzer  (1989,  p.  737). They  refer  to  an  unpublished  experimental  study  by 
Raimond Battalio,  who  seems  to  show  that  low  income (underfed)  rats  tend  to  have  a 
lower  discount rate  than high  income (well  fed)  rats. Ratty behaviour  is  consistent with 
Uzawa’s assumptions. 274  Hendrik  P.  van  Dalen 
while the differential equations can be reformulated in a similar fashion: 
The current-value  Hamiltonian  as given  in  (8), 
can be rewritten in present value terms. The present value of the imputed 
national  income  H, to  be  discounted  at the  rate  of  time  preference 
p[U(.)],  is  given  by: 
The optimum  consumption  level,  c, is  determined at the level at which 
the present value  (9) of  income is maximized. Necessary  and  sufficient 
conditions  for  an  interior  solution  are,  in  addition  to  the  national 
resource  constraint: 
;z  =  A([)  (p[U(c)]  + 6 + n -  Zfl(k)) 
To understand  condition  (10)  we  can  rewrite it as follows: 
This condition  points  out that  the  planner  should equate the  marginal 
utility of consumption (ix. the LHS) to the sum of the imputed value of 
investment,  A,  and  the  marginal  increase  in  the  present  value  of  the 
imputed  income  due  to  a  marginal  decrease  in  the  rate  of  time 
preference. If  the rate  of  time  prefernce, p(.), is constant this relation 
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steady  state  allocation  (c,  k) is  characterised  by  the  following  two 
conditions: 
Zf’ =  p[U(c)]  +  n + 6 
c = Zf(k) -  (6 + n)k 
Equation (14) is the modified golden rule of capital accumulation, i.e. the 
social  planner  should  accumulate  capital  up  to  the  point  where  the 
marginal  productivity  of  capital  equals  the  sum  of  the  rate  of  time 
preference, the population  growth rate and the rate of depreciation. The 
steady-state rate  of  time  preference  is  determined  by  the  consumption 
possibilities, as  given  in  equation  (15). 
If  we  compare the steady state effect of  a population  growth decline 
on the rate of capital accumulation in the case where time preference is 
exogenous to the above presented case of  endogenous time preference, we 
can  derive  the  following comparative  statics  results: 
1 
1 -  p’U’k 
< 0  if  p‘U‘k < 1  (17)  Zf”  -  p’U’[Zf’  -  6 -  n] 
The additional condition on the product of the marginal rate of change 
in  the rate of  time preference times the marginal utility  and the capital 
stock  is  satisfied  since  the  larger  the  capital  the  larger  the  level  of 
consumption  per  capita  will  be.  This will  give  rise  to a lower marginal 
utility  of  consumption,  approaching  zero  if  consumption  is  extremely 
high. If  we  compare  (16)  to (17) we  can  see that  a population  growth 
decline in the case of exogenous time preference leads to a larger change 
in capital accumulation than in  the case of  endogenous time preference. 
An  increase in  the  rate  of  time  preference  ‘compensates’ part  of  the 
population  growth decline. This effect of demographic change has been 
neglected in  a large number  of  practical studies (see, e.g.,  Cutler  et al. 
1990). It would  seem that a population  decline that  is accompanied by 
a  shift  in  time  preference is  not  entirely farfetched. 
I  will stop the exposition of  the closed economy at this point and go 
on  to  examine  the  interaction  in  a  two-country  world  economy.  For 
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preference  one  is  referred  to  Uzawa  (1968)  and  for  extensions of  the 
basic model  one is  referred  to  Obstfeld  (1990). 
3.  A  DEMOGRAPHICALLY DIVIDED  WORLD  ECONOMY 
In a neoclassical two-country  growth model (3), a  steady state equili- 
brium  should eventually be  characterised by  an  equality of  golden rule 
parameters.  In  general this would  imply equality of  population growth 
rates  plus  rates  of  time  preference,  whatever the  setting may  be.  This 
equality would seem at first sight rather improbable. To wit, the past and 
present world  population is non-stable: the population in the developed 
world  grows  at  a  significantly lower  rate  than  the  population  of  the 
developing world. The ‘theory’ of demographic transition points out that 
in  the  long  run  population  growth  rates  converge,  but  given  the 
difficulties developing countries encounter one may well  wonder whether 
this theory is  at all times a good description of development problems. 
There  must  be  more  to  economic  development  then  imposing  the 
‘transversality’  condition  of  identical  population  growth  rates.  This 
difficulty  has  led  many  authors  to  back  away  from  the  problems  of 
divergences in  time  preference or  population  growth.  Indeed,  Ramsey 
(1928, p. 559) himself conjectured that under conditions of a divergence 
in  rates  of  time preference: 
N...  equilibrium would be attained by a division of society  into two classes, 
the  thrgty enjoying  bliss  and  the  improvident  at  the  subsistence  leveh 
One could,  however, well  imagine that in  the  steady state the  equality 
p1 +  n, =  pz +  n2 holds by  some explicit relationship between either time 
preference and consumption  or population growth (4)  and consumption. 
A similar assumption has been made by  Becker and Barro (1988, p. 14). 
They  assume  for  a  model  of  endogenous  fertility  that  the  rate  of 
(altruism)-time preference depends negatively on the number of children. 
Recent work concerning the endogeneity of time preference is found in 
Epstein and Hynes (1 983) and Epstein (1  987). They extend and generalise 
(I)  The limitation and  extensions of the standard  infinite horizon neoclassical growth 
In  a  two-country  overlapping  generations  model  of  international  lending  and 
model are  discussed in  Becker  and  Majumdar  (1989) and  Van  Dalen  (1992). 
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the  work  by  Uzawa  (1968)  and  Becker  (1980).  The  present  analysis 
concentrates on the derivation of a proposition  concerning international 
lending and borrowing by  paying attention to differences in  population 
growth or the state of  technology. In an international  setting Pitchford 
(1989) used the Uzawa-model  to examine the current  account dynamics 
of permanent and transitory (exogenous) income fluctuations for a small 
open economy. One of the main results was that when discount rates are 
endogenous one needs to know whether an income shock is permanent or 
temporary before the economic consequences of income fluctuations can 
be  established. The  international trade  analyses like Pitchford’s (’)  are, 
however, generally of  a partial  equilibrium nature by  assuming a small 
open economy. In the present setting, the world economy consists of two 
interdependent  countries  engaging  in  international  lending  and  factor 
price  formation is  endogenous. 
3.1  THE WORLD  MODEL 
The  world  economy  consists  of  two  countries,  each  inhabited  by 
a  social planner  who  uses  the  welfare  function  (1)  in  section  2  as the 
economic policy objective. The differential equations for countries h (for 
h = 1, 2) include one for the development of physical capital, k,, and one 
for  foreign  assets,  dh, and  they  can  be  reformulated  in  the  following 
fashion: 
The patterns of international lending and borrowing are restricted by  the 
No-Ponzi-game condition  (see  for  an exposition O’Connell and  Zeldes, 
1988).  This  condition  requires  that  the  present  value  of  a  country’s 
wealth, arbitrarily far in the future, be non-negative. In other words, the 
country’s per capita wealth should not increase asymptotically faster than 
the interest  rate  net  of  population  growth,  (r(t) -  nh): 
(’)  But  see  also  Obstfeld (1983),  Engel  and  Kletzer (1989) and  Penati  (1987). 278  Hendrik  P. van  Dalen 
where  the  short  term  discount  factor  Rh(t)  is  given  by, 
To keep things at an analytical level I will  use for the remainder of the 
analysis  identical  discount  rate  functions:  p1  (.) =  p2  (.) =  p  (a).  The 
present-value Hamiltonian  for  this  command  problem  is  given  by  the 
following formulation: 
+  Ah (t)  {jh (t) -  (6, +  kh (t)} 
f  ph  (r)  {  'hfh  Lkh  -  'h (t> -  ih (t)  +  (r -  nh)  dh  (I)))  (21) 
The optimum consumption  level,  ch, is determined at the level  at which 
the present value  (21) of income is maximized. Necessary and sufficient 
conditions  for  an interior  solution  are: 
lim e-P(')ph  (t)  dh  (t)  = 0 
?+OD 
For the remainder of this paper I will concentrate on steady states, since 
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manner  in  the  economics  literature.  A  steady  state  allocation  in 
a two-country world (i.e. dkh/dt = ddh/dt = 0 for h = 1, 2) can be  defined 
as the  allocation  that  is  consistent  with  the  following set of  equations: 
Equation  (28) is the modified golden rule of capital accumulation.  Since 
the  stock  of  foreign  assets  and  the  rate  of  time  preference  are 
interdependent  one  can  deduce  that  under  conditions  of  (1)  identical 
production  technologies, but  different  population  growth  rates,  the  low 
population  growth  country  is  a  steady  state  net  creditor  and  the  high 
population growth country a net debtor;  (ii) identical population growth 
rates  but  different  production  technologies,  the  relatively  technological 
advanced  country  is  a  steady  state  net  debtor  and  the  less  advanced 
neighbour  is a steady  state  net  creditor. 
Another comparison must  be made with respect to the existing body 
of literature on borrowing  and lending in  infinite horizon  models.  With 
constant  rates  of  time  preference  the  optimal  foreign  debt  used  to be 
indeterminate.  But  with  the  formulation  of  endogenous  time  preference 
the optimal debt in this two-country  world economy is determinate. This 
result arises mainly because in  the  standard  model with  a given  rate of 
time  preference  foreign  debt  was  merely  used  to  smooth  consumption 
streams.  With  endogenous  time  preference  the  foreign  debt  affects 
consumption  behaviour.  The  determinacy  of  wealth  distributions  is 
undoubtedly a characteristic  of this model -that gives it a a competitive 
edge over  the  standard  neoclassical growth  model. 
One other  interesting  observation  that  can  be  made  at this  stage is 
about  the  steady  state  consumption  and  distribution  of  wealth  in 
a demographically divided world: if  all countries have the same discount 
rate function  and production  technologies, but different rates  of  popula- 
tion growth, then all countries have the same steady state capital-labour 
ratio  but  the  country  with  the  lowest  (highest) population  growth  will 
have the  highest (lowest) steady state consumption level. If the discount 
functions differ, steady state distributions will  be more complex. What is 
most puzzling about the present formulation of optimal economic growth 
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wealth  and  it  enabled  one  to  enjoy  a  higher  level  of  consumption, 
whereas  in  the  Uzawa-formulation  the  wealthy  are  characterised  by 
a  high  rate  of  impatience. Perhaps  the  last  interpretation  is  not  quite 
correct, since ‘patience’ depends on the level of consumption, hence each 
individual lives within his/her means. The relatively wealthy are therefore 
those countries or persons who can shift relatively more resources from 
the future to the present. In this way  one can circumvent the postponed 
splurge in consumption which arises in case the planner is of a Benthami- 
te  persuasion  with  a  finite  horizon  and  the  population  growth  rate 
exceeds the  rate  of  time  preference; a  property  of  the  optimal  growth 
model  which  Koopmans  (1967,  1976) found  undesirable. 
The ability of the present model to generate time paths with a positive 
level  of  consumption  at  some  point  in  the  future  in  both  countries, 
despite a divergence in population growth rates, must not be underesti- 
mated.  The  early  literature  on  optimal  capital  accumulation  takes  the 
view (e.g., Inada, 1968, p. 324) that it is irrelevant to treat countries with 
different growth rates. For instance, Inada examines the consequences of 
different population  growth  rates  and  asserts  that  identical population 
growth rates are not a severe limitation to international growth models 
because c([i]f the population growth rate in one country is greater than in 
the other country, after  a  sufficiently long period  the  former  economy 
becomes overwhelmingly large compared with the latter economy..  .  ))  and 
cc[t]he  capital  accumulation process in  [the former economy] under  free 
trade is  described approximately by  the same model as in the no-trade 
situation)). In  the  long  run  this  assertion  is  certainly  true,  but  in 
a medium term context the divergence of  population  growth rates must 
be  of  influence  on  international  capital  flows  and  consumption  beha- 
viour. Dixit (1981, p. 283) draws attention to the difficulties involved in 
the  treatment  of  different  growth  rates  in  the  trading  countries.  E.g., 
((during the  course  of  the  supposed  steady  state,  trading  prices  must 
change from the  autarky prices of  one country to those of  the other)>. 
These consequences of  different growth rates are ((inconsistent with  the 
logic of a steady state)). The model seems to embody the feeling that is 
inherent in intertemporal planning and expressed vividly by  Solow (1974, 
p.  9):  ((We have actally done quite well  at the hands of  our ancestors. 
Given how  poor  they  were  and how  rich we  are, they might properly 
have saved less and consumed more)). However, the model seems to have 
some implications that run counter to plain observation. The rich (i.e. the 
country  with  the  superior  production  technology) turn  out  to  be  net 
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At present it would seem like a fair description to say that the developed 
world can be  seen as a net creditor and the developing world as the net 
debtor.  The implicit  assumption  in  this  paper  was  that  countries have 
identical preferences and, of  course, countries can  have different utility 
and  time  preference  functions  which  give  rise  to  more  real-to-life 
descriptions.  But  then  one  has  to  study  the  relationship  between  how 
preferences  develop in  response to  technology and  endowments. 
The  present  model  is  quite  flexible when  it  comes  to  describing the 
transition  of  an  interdepent  two-country  world  economy  to  a  world 
economy in  which one country, the high population growth country, acts 
in the long run as if  it is a closed economy and the low population growth 
country has become so small that it faces a world interest rate, determined 
by  the high population growth country. A question that springs to mind is: 
can  the  low  population  growth country  have  a  non-negligible influence 
n the world capital market, even in  the long-run? Different discount rate 
functions could certainly give  rise  to this situation. The per  capita debt, 
corrected for the relative population sizes, must then tend  to some finite 
number.  For every  identical steady  state consumption allocation, c, one 
has  to  assume  that  p1 [U(c)]  > p,[U(c)],  for  the  case  n, <  n,,  so  that 
c1 > c,.  The low population growth country is under those circumstances 
the net creditor and the high  population growth country the net  debtor. 
The trouble with this solution is that one tends to fall back on arbitrary 
differences  in  time  preference functions that  cannot  be justified  in  any 
normative sense. Hence we  are left with the unsatisfactory state of affairs 
that  by  removing an  arbitrary  element  from  the  optimal growth  model 
- constant  rate  of  time  preference - one  has  to  face  a  new  arbitrary 
element, viz.  the  functional form  of  the  rate  of  time  preference. 
3.2 NORMATIVE INTERPRETATION 
The normative significance of the present section is of  some considera- 
ble  importance.  The  way  in  which  we  value  living  standards  and 
especially population  developments in  the  world  of  today  can  fall into 
one  of  the  two  extreme  welfare  criteria:  the  total  utility  criterion 
L . U[C/L],  as proposed by  Meade (1955), or the average utility criterion, 
U[C/L].  The total utility (or Benthamite) criterion could imply a Vatican 
stance  in  questions  of  population  policy,  viz.  the  more  the  merrier 
whereas the average utility criterion leads to a  Malthusian  attitude:  the 
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when  numbers  differ  both  principles  are  unsatisfactory  policy  devices 
when one has to make a judgment over the value of life (as represented 
by living standards). Ng (1989) ‘solves’ the problem by introducing an ad 
hoc  compromise:  maximization  of  number-dampened  total  utility, 
q(L)  . U[C/L] where q’  > 0, q” < 0 and q(.)  is bounded from above, i.e. 
the  function  q  never  reaches  infinity,  even  if  L goes  to  infinity. This 
function  which  establishes a  compromise  has  no  economic  or  ethical 
content at all. The value attached  to the first person exceeds all values 
attached  to  other  persons  in  the  economy. 
Another solution is offered by  Michel (1990) who opts for the ethical 
stance in which the social rate of time preference equals the growth rate 
of population. This would indeed solve the problem of a demographically 
divided world, but it remains ad hoc in that it is merely a translation of 
the undiscounted  average utility  case to the conditions of undiscounted 
total utility. It embodies the rather unhappy implication that the planners 
of  relatively  fast  growing populations  may  use  a  higher  discount  rate 
than the planners representing slower growing populations. The welfare 
analysis with  the  Uzawa-utility function avoids the ad  hocery(6) of  Ng 
(1989)  and  Michel (1990)  and,  in  fact, endogenises the  care for  future 
generations. Endogenous time preference formation establishes a compro- 
mise  between  the average utility criterion and the total utility criterion. 
Besides that, the country with the relatively superior production techno- 
logy  will  consume  less  than  it  would  have  done  in  autarky  and  raise 
consumption abroad by  borrowing resources. In case production techolo- 
gies are identical but population growth rates differ one will arrive at the 
conclusion that, in  an interdependent world economy, the social planner 
of the country with the fast(er) growing population  should care relatively 
more about future generations than  the planner  of the slow(er) growing 
population. Each  social planner  has  to take into  account  the  domestic 
and foreign rate  of  population growth  (n,,) and  the state of  technology 
In order to discern how the allocation changes as shocks in technology 
or population  growth occurs. I  will perform the analysis of comparative 
(zh?  bh). 
(6)  A referee pointed out that the model of endogenous time preference is equally ad hoc 
in  that one has to impose certain restriction to ensure stability. This is indeed true, but then 
again every  model is  ad hoc in  that one needs additional assumptions to  ensure stability. 
The model is however not ad hoc in  that  it comes close to a microeconomic foundation of 
a  crucial  growth parameter,  whereas  North-South theorists  and  the  analyses by  Michel 
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statics for  an interdependent world  economy with  diverging population 
developments in  the  next  section. 
3.3 COMPARATIVE STATICS 
If  we  totally  differentiate the  set  of  equations (28)-(30) we  have six 
equations explaining the variables  c,,  r, d and  k, (for h = 1,  2).  In the 
appendix to  this  paper  the  full derivation  is  given  of  the  comparative 
statics. At  this point  I  will  restrict myself  to discussing the  qualitative 
outcomes of  the comparative statics. 
Table  I 
Comparative statics 
Population  Depreciation  Technology 
Shocks  in:  growth  rate  rate 
n1  n2  61  62  Zl  z2 
a)  if  p’U’a, < 1,  where  a, = k, + d. 
b)  if  p’U’a, < 1, where  a, = k, -  d.  L,/L,. 
c) if  p’U’k, < 1  for h = 1,  2. 
First  of  all,  it  must  be  said  that  some  of  the  standard  results  of 
neoclassical capital  theory  still  stand. What  does differ  from  standard 
theory are the international  spillover effects.  For instance, the effect of 
a population growth decline on consumption per capita is always positive 
for the country where the population shock occurs but the effect abroad 
depends on the sign of  (p’U’a, -  1). In effect, the influence of a popula- 
tion  growth  shock  on  capital  accumulation,  foreign  assets,  the  world 
interest rate and consumption abroad depend on the sign of (p’U’a, -  1). 
In  Table  I  I  have  presentend  the  effects  with  the  restriction  that 
p‘U‘a, < 1 (for h = 1,  2). As we  saw in  section 2 this is a rather  likely 
restriction: with  a very  large asset position one’s consumption is  bound 
to be  large and  therefore the  marginal utility  as well  as the  marginal 
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To  proceed  with  the  comparative  statics,  the  effects  of  technology 
(i$, Z,) are to a large extent unambiguous.  Positive technology shocks, 
z,,, give rise to an increase in consumption and thereby the rate of time 
preference, irrespective of the country where the shock occurred. A shock 
in the state of technology does, however, have an ambiguos effect on the 
rate of  capital  accumulation at  home  (i.e.  dkh/dZh  5 0). E.g.,  a positive 
shock in the state of technology occuring in country  1  leads to a rise in 
the world  interest rate as a consequence of  the rise in  the rate of time 
preference (  p [  UJ).  The increase in the world interest rate leads to a fall 
in capital accumulation in  country  2,  but the effect on k,  is ambiguous 
because,  on  the  one  hand,  the  need  to accumulate  more  capital  has 
increased (see es. 28) and on the other hand the planner feels the need to 
consume part of this newly acquired wealth and increase the rate of time 
preference. 
There is  however a  difficulty when  differences in population  growth 
arise.  As  long  as  a  difference in  population  growth  rates  exists  (and 
discount rate functions are identical), the country with the relatively high 
rate of population growth (i.e. country 2) will  have a negligible amount 
of  interest  (corrected for  the  rate  of  population  growth)  to  pay  since: 
lim (r -  n2)  d .  L,/L2  =  0 
1-.W 
In  the  steady  state,  the  high  population  growth  country  accumulates 
assets us if it is  a closed economy. The low population growth country 
becomes under those circumstances a small open economy and the social 
planner  receives interest  payments  on its  foreign assets. 
Summarizing, the interdependent nature of the world economy of this 
section  is  apparent.  Whether  a  change  in  endowments  or technology 
occurs at home or abroad, it always affects consumption, investment and 
factor prices  in  both  countries. 
4.  SUMMARY 
The central aim of this paper was to explore the question how shocks 
in the population growth rate and the state of technology of a country 
affect international lending and borrowing, time preference, consumption 
and  investment  in  an  interdependent  world  economy.  Empirically, 
investment fluctuations appear to be an important determinant of current 
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and Obstfeld , 1983) abstract from investment by  the use  of the partial 
equilibrium framework of a small open economy. Interdependent econo- 
mies with endogenous investment turn  out to be extremely complicated 
as  Bovenberg  (1989)  and  Cantor  and  Mark  (1987)  show,  but  still  it 
brings to the fore how actions and endowments abroad affect actions at 
home.  However,  a  simple  one-sector  model  of  optimal  growth  in 
a two-country world  economy allows only a limited number of popula- 
tion growth paths to be studied. In an infinite horizon model convergen- 
ce  of  population  growth  rates  is  a necessary condition  for steady state 
patterns of international lending and borrowing to be a viable solution, 
without ending up with a repugnant conclusion. When time preference is 
endogenous and depends on the utility  of current consumption streams, 
a divergence in population growth rates will be offset by  the rate of  time 
preference.  A  low  population  growth  country  will  therefore  have 
a high(er) rate of time preference and the opposite proposition applies to 
the high population growth country.  The model is more flexible since it 
can  trace  the  time  path  of  asset  accumulation  in  a  permanently 
demographically divided  world  economy. Another  important  aspect of 
the  steady  state  equilibrium  is  that  the  wealth  distribution  in  an 
interdependent  world  economy is  determinate,  as opposed to the  stan- 
dard infinite horizon model where this distribution remains indetermina- 
te.  The  long-run  consequences  of  a  divergences  of  a  divergence  in 
population growth rates are however trivial: the high population  growth 
country  accumulates capital  as if  it  is  a  closed  economy and  the  low 
population growth country accumulates assets as a small open economy 
facing a perfectly competitive international capital market, represented by 
the  economy of  the  high  population  growth  country. 
The  present  paper  has  addressed  a  question  that  numerous  authors 
have  assumed away (’)  or considered unimportant.  The introduction  of 
diverging population growth developments does however add a piece of 
reality  to  the  Ramsey-model  that  would  have  gone  unnoticed  if  we 
conveniently assumed population growth rates constant and equal to one 
another. With an increasing use of the Koopmans-Cass model of  capital 
accumulation in normative and positive anayses (such as the real business 
(’)  E.g., Bardhan (1965), Oniki and Uzawa (1965) and Inada  (1968) all play  down the 
difficulties of using different growth rates in models of international lending and borrowing. 
The  only  exception to  this  rule  is  Deardorff  (1985,  1987)  who  considers the  economic 
consequences of  a world of  diverging populations in a model that resembles the outcomes 
of  Pasinetti’s two-class  growth model. 286  Hendrik  P. van  Dalen 
cycle strand of  literature) it  seems like a worthwhile exercise to explore 
and  elaborate  the  use  of  this  model  in  an  international  setting.  The 
extension of  endogenous time preference proved a  more  flexible edifice 
for questions of international lending and borrowing in a demographical- 
ly divided world. It is shown that international debt in an interdependent 
world economy can bring about a convergence of time preference; a ‘fact’ 
which  may, just  as  well  as  the  spillover  effect  of  human  capital  (see 
Tamura,  199 l), explain income convergence. However, one  should  not 
get carried away by  these remarks. Endogeneity of time preference begs 
the  question  about  the  form  of  time  preference  functions.  Here,  as 
elsewhere in  the economics literature stability assumption were imposed. 
Perhaps unstable paths may not be so elegant but on the other hand they 
may be more realistic. Future empirical work will  have to show whether 
the  theory  of  endogenous  time  preference was  a  worthwhile  exercise. 
Despite  these  warnings,  the  normative  question  of  optimal  economic 
growth  posed  in  this  paper  may  be  of  some importance for  studying 
development  problems  of  LDCs  and  ageing  problems  of  developed 
countries hand in hand, since it is one of the stylised facts and forecasts 
that  the  present  day  world  economy  is  and  will  be  demographically 
divided  (see,  e.g.,  Brown  and  Jacobson,  1986). 
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APPENDIX:  COMPARATIVE STATICS AND ENDOGENOUS TIME PREFERENCE 
The following set of  equations  is  sufficient to derive the steady state 
general  equilibrium effects of  changes in  parameters  (for  h = 1, 2): 
r = Zh  f;  -  6, 
If  n, <  n, one can use the limit property of the long-run population  size 
ratio: 
lim L,  (t)/L,  (t)  = 0  (A.5) 
t'W 
Under  those  circumstances  the  comparative  statics  apply  to  the  case 
where the high population growth country accumulates capital as if  it is 
a closed economy, while  the low  population growth country  is a  small Optimal  international debt  and  endogenous  time preference  289 
open  economy  with  the  world  interest  rate  determined  by  the  high 
population  growth  country.  Totally  differentiating  these  equations  we 
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(*) To  shorten  notation  and  derivatives,  production  y, = Z,,/;(.) and  p'  denotes 
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